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FAIRNESS, CHARACTER, AND EFFICIENCY IN FIRMS
ROBERT COOTERt & MELVIN A. EISENBERG"
In the middling and inferior stations of life, the road to virtue and
that to fortune, to such fortune, at least, as men in such stations can
reasonably expect to acquire, are, happily in most cases, very nearly the
same. In all the middling and inferior professions, real and solid
professional abilities, joined to prudent, just, firm, and temperate
conduct, can very seldom fail of success.
-Adam Smith'
INTRODUCTION
What forces shape the conduct of individuals and firms? Legal
scholars traditionally focused on the explicit content of the directions
that legal rules give to people. Within the last twenty-five years,
however, law-and-economics scholars have shifted the focus from
explicit directions to the implicit incentives created by legal rules.
Within the last ten years, both lawyers and law-and-economics scholars
have turned their attention to the interaction between legal rules and
nonlegal norms. This recent discussion mostly concerns the norms of
large social groups, such as the general society, merchant
communities, ethnic groups, or the corporate community. We call
norms of this type general social norms. In contrast, this Article
concerns norms that are specific to firms: in particular, firm-specific
fairness norms.
We advance two theses: First, firm-specific fairness norms typically
promote efficiency. Second, firm-specific fairness norms best
promote efficiency when supported by reputation effects and when
the firm's agents internalize the norms. Internalized norms become
part of an agent's character. We will develop the concept of good agent
character, by which we mean agent character that serves the firm's
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profitability by embodying the firm's fairness norms. This neglected
topic helps explain how firms work and why they exist.
I. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES
We begin with the issue, what constitutes a norm. A common
approach to this issue is to define norms as unofficial standards of
conduct. We call this type of definition standards-based.
Standards-based definitions are unduly exclusive, because in
ordinary language the term "norm" encompasses regularities that are
not standards, such as the practice of directors, prior to the 1990s, to
exercise only limited diligence.2  Violating a standard of behavior
typically provokes criticism by others, whereas departing from a mere
regularity only prompts surprise.
Standards-based definitions are also unduly inclusive, because they
encompass types of standards that are not characterized as norms in
ordinary language. Norms are only one kind of standard. Another
consists of explicit private rules, such as the rules of organized
baseball. Although rules of this sort are regularly enforced and
complied with, they are seldom if ever referred to as norms. A third
kind of standard consists of cultural values, such as whether social
standing is based on merit or lineage, whether there is social approval
or disapproval of commerce and merchants, and whether the society's
ideology emphasizes individuals or groups. Like explicit rules,
cultural values are usually not called norms.
In short, social standards range in a spectrum from explicit private
rules, through norms, to cultural values. Two elements characterize
movement along this spectrum. The first element is specificity.
Usually, explicit private rules are highly specific; norms are less
specific; and cultural values are highly general. The second element is
the mechanism of creation and change. Explicit private rules are
promulgated, amended, and repealed. Norms evolve as practices and
commitments shift. Cultural values are transmitted through
socialization into a way of life.
Bearing all these considerations in mind, we define norms as social
standards and regularities other than explicit private rules or cultural values.
Like the general society, every firm has its own rules, norms, and
cultural values, which we call firm-specific. Our particular interest in
2 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1253,
1266 (1999).
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this Article is in firm-specific fairness norms, that is, norms of a firm
that require fair conduct by its agents.
II. FIRM-SPECIFIC FAIRNESS NORMS AND EFFICIENCY
People can often create value by cooperating with one another.
The value that they create must be distributed. Disputes over
distribution impede cooperation and waste resources. Fairness norms
reduce disputes over distribution. Our first thesis is that firm-specific
fairness norms promote a firm's efficiency by increasing cooperation
among its agents. Next we explain several manifestations of the
efficiency of firm-specific fairness norms.
A. Loyalty
To begin with, firms can be efficient only if their agents render
loryal performance, by which we mean that the agents perform their
contractual obligations diligently and honestly. Diligent and honest
agents create value by cooperating with their firms and co-agents,
whereas disloyal agents redistribute wealth to themselves by slacking
and deceiving or otherwise betraying their firms and co-agents.
One way to achieve loyal performance is by legal sanctions. Legal
sanctions alone, however, have limited effectiveness, because
detecting breaches of the duty of loyalty is difficult and legal
enforcement is expensive.
Bonding and monitoring provide other methods of achieving
loyalty. For example, a corporation may award options to an agent
that vest after a fixed number of years of employment. Such options
bond the agent to the corporation in two ways. First, because the
agent will do well if the corporation does well, the agent has an
incentive to do what is best for the corporation. Second, if the
corporation detects disloyalty by the agent during the relevant period,
it can discharge the agent before the options vest, so that the agent
loses the options. Additionally, a firm may employ external and
internal auditing systems and various compliance programs to
monitor its agents.
Like legal sanctions, bonding and monitoring devices are
expensive and have limited effectiveness. A more effective and
reliable method for ensuring loyalty is the development of a regime of
firm-specific fairness norms. As we explain below, developing such a
regime also has costs, but the costs are typically lower than those
associated with either legal enforcement or bonding and monitoring.
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Legal sanctions, monitoring, and bonding all have an important place
in ensuring diligence and honesty by agents, but norms have the
central role in achieving that objective.
B. Supracontractual Performance
In Part ILA, we explained that firm-specific fairness norms
promote efficiency by inducing diligent and honest performance of
contractual obligations. However, firms will be most efficient if agents
go beyond their contractual obligations. For example, subordinates
may put in longer hours and exert more effort than their contract
requires, in which case we say that performance is supracontractual.
Firms have an obvious efficiency interest in inducing supracontractual
performance.
A subordinate who performs supracontractually will normally do
so because she forms a reasonable, noncontractual expectation that,
when the time comes, her superiors will reward her with a raise or a
promotion or in some other way. Such expectations are special cases
of the well-known phenomenon of implicit contracts. In such cases,
however, it is often easy and profitable (at least in the short run) for
superiors to exploit the subordinates' trust by not fulfilling the latters'
expectations. Accordingly, before agents render supracontractual
performance they need a reasonable degree of assurance that their
trust will not be exploited opportunistically.
In a world of perfect information and no transaction costs, agents
could protect against this kind of opportunism by contract. A perfect
contract would encompass the subordinate's future performance,
endogenous changes in the firm, exogenous changes that affect the
firm, and what constitutes fair treatment under a variety of
circumstances. In the real world, contractual protection of this sort
usually fails because the needed terms are difficult to specify, observe,
and prove.
Firm-specific fairness norms enter to supplement imperfect
contracting.3 Two kinds of firm-specific fairness norms are relevant.
The first consists of firm-specific versions of general fairness norms,
such as "Reciprocate within the firm," and "Don't lie within the firm."
These norms are firm-specific rather than general, because at least in
principle they are compatible with norms that tolerate acting
nonreciprocally and telling lies to people outside the firm. The
3 Benjamin E. Hermalin, Economics & Corporate Culture, in THE HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND CLIMATE (S. Cartwright et al., eds. 2001).
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second kind of firm-specific fairness norm consists of norms that help
define fairness within the firm. For example, compensation depends
on seniority in some law firms, while in others it depends on the
amount of business that a partner generates. Paying a young partner
top compensation could be fair in the second context and unfair in
the first.
C. Mentoing
Continuity in most firms requires a mentoring system under which
superiors train subordinates to assume ever greater responsibility.
Mentoring involves significant costs. A good mentor must not only
incur time and trouble, but must also share ith the protdg6 valuable
skills, techniques, and secrets about the firm and even about himself.
There are various reasons why superiors are willing to incur these
costs. Some of these reasons are self-seeking and others are not. In
the absence of a regime of fairness norms, superiors are unlikely to
mentor subordinates, because the superior will not be able to count
on the subordinate to reciprocate appropriately, keep secrets, and so
forth.
III. REPUTATION AND GOOD AGENT CHARACTER
We previously explained that firm-specific fairness norms promote
efficiency by encouraging loyalty, supracontractual performance, and
mentoring. Now we explain why people might respect firm-specific
fairness norms and adhere to them. In an effective regime of firm-
specific fairness norms, the firm's agents have some assurance that
adherence will be substantial and not merely nominal. Two
mechanisms especially provide such assurance: reputation effects and
good agent character. We explain several ways that reputation and
character support fairness norms.
A. Reputation Effects
An agent may adhere to firm-specific fairness norms because he
believes that acquiring a reputation for adhering will further his own
interests. For example, if a superior develops a reputation for truth-
telling, reciprocity, and trustworthiness within the firm, he will be
more able to induce supracontractual performance from
subordinates. Conversely, if a superior develops a reputation for
lying, nonreciprocity, and untrustworthiness within the firm, he will
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be less able to induce supracontractual performance. Therefore, a
superior may tell the truth, reciprocate, and act like a trustworthy
person, not authentically, because he has internalized firm-specific
fairness norms, but instrumentally, to obtain the reputation that he
needs to induce supracontractual performance from subordinates.
As a method of making firm-specific fairness norms effective,
reputation is important but imperfect. For example, the existence of
an implicit contract and the failure of a superior to honor such a
contract are often difficult to demonstrate to third parties.
Furthermore, a superior's reputation only imperfectly follows her
move to another firm or even her transfer within the firm. A
subordinate therefore knows that imperfect information gives
superiors significant leeway to break implicit contracts without a loss
of reputation. Reputation effects are especially problematic when a
relationship is ending, because the two parties no longer have the
expectation that they will receive future rewards for conveying present
benefits.
A subordinate also knows that if a superior's only motive for
acting fairly is reputation, then when the time comes to reciprocate
the superior will make an instrumental calculation of costs and
benefits. Specifically, the superior will consider whether his gain from
failure to reciprocate will exceed his loss of reputation discounted by
the prospect of detection. Bruce Chapman explains how these
calculations can defeat themselves:
[Suppose that an individual who acts only on an instrumental basis
makes a promise, and put aside the issue of legal enforceability.] The
question ... is whether such a promise can be a credible one in the eyes
of... other individuals. The difficulty is that a promise made for only
an instrumental or forward-looking reason, the sort of reason that a
rational maximizer of her own preferences would provide, is a promise
that should, rationally, be broken when it pays to do so.... Having
promised, for purely instrumental reasons, to [perform, the individual]
will find that these same instrumental reasons tell her to break the promise
that she has made. Furthermore, all this instrumentally rational
behaviour can be predicted perfectly by the other individuals; after all,
they too are rational in this way.
Kenneth Arrow makes a related comment about trust: "Trust
is... extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree
of reliance on other people's word. Unfortunately this is not a
Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation,
43 U. TORONTO L.J. 547, 581 (1993).
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commodity which can be bought very easily. If you have to buy it, you
already have some doubts about what you've bought."
B. Good Agent Character
Another mechanism for making a regime of finn-specific fairness
norms effective is good agent character. Before considering this
specific concept, we must examine the general concept of good
character. Earlier we identified standards-based norms, which supply
standards for evaluating behavior. The internalization of standards by
actors is closely related to good character. Internalization has two
aspects that parallel the preceding distinction between regularities
and obligations. First, an actor may adhere to an internalized norm
reflexively. The economist Kaushik Basu describes reflexive adher-
ence to a norm:
[Certain norms stop] us from doing certain things or choosing certain
options, irrespective of how much utility that thing or option gives us.
Thus most individuals would not consider picking another person's
wallet in a crowded bus. This they would do not by speculating about
the amount the wallet is likely to contain, the chances of getting caught,
the severity of the law and so on, but because they consider stealing
wallets as something that is sinply not done.!
An actor may also adhere to an internalized norm out of
deliberate commitment. In deciding what to do, a sense of
commitment to norms receives weight relative to the actor's self-
interest. To illustrate, assume that an actor recognizes that adhering
to a norm has more costs than benefits to herself. If she adheres to
the norm anyway, then her adherence demonstrates her sense of
commitment. In general, adherence against self-interest demon-
strates commitment to norms.
Self-interest can be defined narrowly to encompass wealth, power,
pleasure, prestige, and little else. Under the narrow definition, self-
interest often conflicts with morality. Alternatively, self-interest can be
defined broadly to encompass moral values, such as truthfulness,
integrity, and generosity. Under the broad definition, self-interest
seldom conflicts with morality. Thus the distinction between
commitment to norms and self-interest is sharp for the narrow
KENNETH ARRow, THE LIMITs OF ORGANIZATION 23 (1974), quoted in Chapman,
%upyz note 4, at 581 n,62.
Kaushik Basu, Social Norms and the Law, in 3 THE NEw PALGRAVE DICrIONAtR OF
Eco\oMICS,\'D THE Lxw 476,477 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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conception and dull for the broad conception.
The premise that people are motivated by normative
commitments challenges much economic thinking, which relies on a
narrow self that is interested only in wealth, power, pleasure, and
prestige. Normative commitment, in contrast, implies a broad
conception of the self. The debate about whether understanding law
requires a narrow or broad conception of the self seems fertile. In
contrast, the debate about whether all behavior is ultimately self-
interested seems tautological and relatively sterile. For this reason, we
will not debate about whether or not all behavior is ultimately self-
interested. Instead, we will develop our argument that understanding
law in general, and the law governing firms in particular, requires a
broad conception of the self.
Just as violating a social standard provokes criticism from others,
so violating an internalized standard provokes self-criticism and guilt.
Those who insist that all behavior is self-interested often want to fold
guilt into the actor's calculation of the cost of violating a norm.
Certainly people want to avoid guilt and other painful feelings.
Reducing normative commitment to the avoidance of guilt, however,
misconstrues commitment in a way that underestimates its stability.
To see why, consider two ways to avoid guilt. An actor may avoid
guilt by changing either her behavior or her feelings. For people who
only seek to avoid psychological pain, eliminating guilt by eliminating
commitment to the norm is just as good as eliminating guilt by
conforming to the norm. For people committed to the norm,
however, these two ways of avoiding guilt are unequal. For a
committed person, the only acceptable way to avoid guilt is by
conforming to the norm. Consequently, a committed person's
adherence to a norm is more stable than the adherence of someone
who merely avoids painful feelings.
We have explained that internalizing a norm involves a
commitment that manifests itself through diminished reflection or
choices against narrow self-interest. The internalization of standards
relates to good character, by which we mean an authentic disposition to
adhere to normative standards, either reflexively or on the basis of
commitment even when against interest. To have good character, a
person need not always adhere to normative standards. It suffices that
she has the disposition to do so and typically does so.
Cynics argue that actors conform to normative standards only for
reputational reasons, as opposed to reasons of internalization. We
reject that argument because it is contradicted not only by experience
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but by experiment. In laboratory games conducted by economists and
social psychologists, people persistently cooperate more than
predicted by reputation effects. For example, people share payoffs
with others when doing so is unnecessary because reputation effects
are eliminated by anonymity.
7
Outside the laboratory, the internalization of norms explains
some important types of behavior for government and law that baffle
theories of narrow self-interest. To illustrate, lawyers in the United
States often abandon more lucrative practices to become federal
judges, presumably because they enjoy participating in public life and
shaping the law to their vision. In other words, judges sacrifice narrow
self-interest for the sake of self-expression, including stamping their
normative commitments on public life. As another example, the
punishment for tax evasion in most countries, discounted by the
probability of prosecution and conviction, is small relative to the gain.
Whereas economic models of self-interest predict low rates of tax
compliance, some countries, like the U.S. and Switzerland, enjoy high
rates of tax compliance. Citizens in these countries apparently have
internalized a normative commitment to tax compliance.8
Economics explains behavior as the confrontation of preferences
and opportunities. For economists, preferences are internal values
manifested by choices, whereas opportunities are external constraints.
Internalizing a normative standard incorporates it into preferences.
In contrast, without internalization an obligation remains external
and therefore only affects behavior by constraining it. Economists
7 Sr Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, The Role of Fairness Considerations and
Rtlatirnshzps in a Judgwk-ntal Perspective of Negotiation, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUT-ION 86 (KennethJ. Arrow et al. eds., 1995); Karen Cook & Karen Hegtvedt,
Empa-iral Evidence of the Sense of Justice, in THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL
FouNDAIIONS OF Lxw 187, 197-200 (Roger D. Master & Margaret Gruter eds., 1992);
Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics
and Evolutionmy Psychology, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 335, 347 (1998); Elizabeth Hoffman et
a.l, Prferenre,, Propery Rights and Anonymity in Bargaining Games, 7 GAMES & ECON.
BEHAw. 346, 371-72 (1994); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements,
Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice,
14J. LEGAL ST UD. 259, 259-60 (1985); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game
Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 1281, 1283 (1993); Paul Graham Loomes
Burrows, The Impact of Fairness on Bargaining Behavior (1990) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors). See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout,
Trust, Trustwoithiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1735 (2001).
Eric Po;ner discusses this phenomenon and proxides an alternative rationale in
Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REv. 1781 (forthcoming
2001).
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typically assume that actors regard their reputations as imposing only
external constraints, not as expressing internalized values. This view
either denies that people have preferences to adhere to normative
standards or denies that people's preferences to obey normative
standards affect aggregate behavior in equilibrium.
So far we have been discussing good general character, by which we
mean the disposition of a person to adhere to society's normative
standards, reflexively or against interest. Good general character,
however, is not our main concern. Our main concern is with good
agent character, by which we mean the disposition of an agent of a firm
to adhere to the firm ' normative standards, reflexively or on the basis
of commitment even when against interest.
General and agent character are separable psychologically. To
illustrate, the Mafia specializes in illegal businesses that require loyalty
among members and ruthlessness towards outsiders. Thus, the Mafia
prizes members with good agent character and bad general character.
Conversely, the two forms of character converge when an institution
requires its members to treat outsiders the same as insiders. Thus, the
Catholic Church ideally requires priests to practice the same honesty
towards everyone.
Earlier we discussed limitations on reputation as a mechanism to
ensure adherence to the firm's norms. Specifically, reputation fails to
ensure adherence when an opportunity arises to make a large gain,
net of reputational costs, by exploiting another's trust. In these
circumstances, a calculation of benefits and costs prompts the actor to
sacrifice reputation. Similarly, reputation does not deter unfairness
when the relevant community cannot detect that an implicit contract
was broken. A person with good character, however, does not behave
opportunistically. Instead, such a person passes over such
opportunities and reflexively or deliberately chooses against interest.
Thus, good agent character generally overcomes the limitations of
reputation.
IV. How FIRMS ASSURE GOOD AGENT CHARACTER
We conjecture that almost every firm benefits from its agents
dealing fairly with itself and one another, although the actual content
of fairness norms differs among firms. Some firms also benefit from
their agents dealing fairly with outsiders, in which case good agent
character goes with good general character. Other firms, however,
benefit from their agents dealing unfairly with outsiders, in which case
good agent character goes with bad general character.
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How can firms ensure good agent character? The most important
mechanisms fall into the categories of screening, filtering, education,
and socialization. Screening occurs when the prospect that a person
ill have good agent character is taken into account in hiring
decisions. Filtering occurs when agent character is taken into account
in promotion decisions. Education occurs when the firm voluntarily
undertakes programs, such as compliance programs, that
communicate the firm's norms to its agents. Socialization occurs when
informal interactions communicate the firm's norms among its
agents. For example, the firm may encourage agents to think of
themselves as firm players, promote social events that increase
cohesion among its agents, and so forth.
Screening and filtering require people to perceive the character
of others. The obstacle to accurate perception is that persons with
bad character may dissemble good character. The ability to dissemble
effectively is limited because character is translucent;, that is, people can
see through actions into character, although not perfectly. In
statistical terms, translucence means that people correctly infer
authentic character from actions with higher frequency than chance
would produce. If people could not infer authentic character from
actions at a rate higher than chance, then rational people would never
attempt to make such inferences. If no one attempted such
inferences, then no one could deceive anyone about character. The
very possibility of deceit implies both that many people assimilate
normative standards into their character and that people infer
authentic character from objective evidence with less error than
chance would produce.
In general, nature creates a parasite for every host. The very
existence of a parasite presupposes the host's existence. Dissemblers
are parasitical not only because they redistribute rather than create,
but also because dissembling by some implies internalization and
authenticity by many.
Like reputation, good agent character only imperfectly ensures
adherence to firm-specific fairness norms. But just as imperfection
does not preclude an important role for reputation effects in firms, so
the possibility of deception does not preclude an important role for
character in firms.
In the next Part we discuss processes through which a person can
acquire good character. Firms seldom provide the means by which
people acquire good character; rather, individuals with good
character typically bring it with them to firms. Therefore, screening
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and filtering dominate education and socialization in the employment
practices of most firms. If firms reward good agent character,
however, then persons without good agent character have an
incentive to change. The next Part discusses how people change their
character.
V. THE ORIGINS OF VALUES
People often change their characters to improve their
opportunities. For example, bankers may cultivate trustworthiness
and computer scientists may cultivate creativity. Similarly, agents of
firms can often increase their opportunities by acquiring good agent
character. Superiors with good agent character have an advantage
over others in inducing supracontractual performance. Superiors
who induce supracontractual performance from their subordinates
increase their probability of success leading to promotion. Similarly,
subordinates with good agent character have an advantage over others
in gaining trust from superiors. Trusted subordinates have a higher
probability of distinguishing themselves and securing promotion.
Superiors also have an incentive to develop more insight into the
character of others, since more insight enables them to screen, filter,
educate, and socialize more effectively. Correspondingly, insightful
subordinates are more likely to attach themselves to superiors with
good firm character, who will repay their trust. Good agent character
in a subordinate also increases the probability of being mentored by a
superior. Insightful superiors will tend to adopt protdgds who will
repay their trust. In short, while agents with bad character are
parasitic, agents with good character and agents with good insight into
character are symbiotic.
Agents with authentic good character and agents who are good
readers of character enjoy a competitive advantage in finding partners
for cooperative ventures. Evolution has, consequently, fitted us to
signal and detect character. Thus, evolutionary forces operating
among and within firms should select for both good agent character
and good insight into character.
Insofar as people with good agent character enjoy better careers,
agents with bad agent character have incentives for improvement.
Improving character involves internalizing normative standards and
thereby adopting them as preferences. While the fact of
internalization is easily demonstrated, explaining how internalization
comes about is much more difficult. Changing one's preferences
requires technique. The plethora of self-help books and therapists
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testify to the fact that one cannot automatically become who one
wants to be. Psychologists have extensively researched the
internalization of norms. Notably, Piaget and Kohlberg have studied
stages in the development of moral reasoning among children.9
According to their theories, children perfect the ability to internalize
moral norms as they acquire a capacity for general reasoning. This
research makes the process sound rational and cool.
In contrast, "depth psychology" often traces the internalization of
morality to irrational processes that are inchoate and hot. According
to these theories, internalization of morality ingrains new impulses in
a child through emotional experiences. An example is Freud's theory
that morality is the "ghost in the nursery," meaning the repressed
memory of parental punishments.' Repression transmutes fear into
guilt. The Freudian idea that internalization attaches a "guilt penalty"
to violating a norm fits well with economic models in which behavior
flows fiom a calculus of psychological benefits and costs." More
recently, theorists have argued that people experience "dissonance"
when facts conflict with commitments. To relieve dissonance, people
change their beliefs about the facts or their commitment to the
values. 2
Piaget presented his ideas about stages in mental development in a series of
books written in French beginning in early 1930s, includingJEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL
JUDGMENT OFTHE CHILD 13-108 (Marjorie Gabain trans., 1965) (1932). Kohlberg also
developed his ideas in a series of books and articles over many years; see Lawrence
Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice, in 1
Ess.\Xs ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT 1, 409-12 (1981), in which the appendix outlines his
account of the six stages of moral development. Flaws in Kohlberg's approach have
generated much criticism from feminists, notably CIaROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PS'CHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEvELOPMENT 18-23 (1982). See also
Nona P. Lyons, Two Perspectives: On Self, Relationships, and Moraliy, in MAPPING THE
MORAL DOMAIN 21 (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988).
I. In Freud's account, morality is the repressed memory of punishment and
threats from a child's father. In technical terms, the superego emerges when a child
represses her Oedipal fears and identifies with her father. See SIGMUND FREUD, THE
EGo AND THE ID 18-29 (James Strachey ed. &Joan Riviere trans., W.W. Norton & Co.
1962) (1960). A clear explanation is in RIcHARD WOLLHEIM, FREUD 177-218 (1971).
i On the use of a guilt penalty to change the payoff matrix in a game, see MARK
CASSON, THE ECONOMICS OF BusINEss CULTURE: GAME THEORY, TRANSACTION COSTS,
AND ECONOMIC PERFORIANCE 29-52 (1991). Antiutilitarian philosophers typically
reject the theory that conforming to a principle of morality involves weighing
alternative reasons and balancing them. For example, see the account of exclusionary
reasons inJOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 267-87 (1986).
SGA. AKERLOF, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
(1Y86); Matthew Rabin, Cognitive Dissonance and Social Change, 23J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 177, 178 (1994).
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We have mentioned some psychological theories of how
preferences change. Perhaps these theories are primitive or perhaps
they hold the promise of yielding effective techniques to change
oneself. In either case, it is sufficient for most purposes of this paper
to assume that people can change their preferences at some cost
without explaining how they do it. We turn now to the logic of
choosing one's preferences.
Assuming that preferences influence opportunities, how would a
rational person choose her own preferences? One possibility is to
invoke meta-preferences or higher-order preferences." To illustrate,
a person's choices might reveal a preference for milk over Coke.
Behind this choice might lie a preference for health over infirmity. In
this example, the first-order preference is for milk and the second-
order preference is for health. Behind our particular preferences lie
more general, abstract preferences. At the highest level, perhaps
some people order all of their specific choices with respect to a
supreme value. Traditional candidates for a supreme value among
philosophers include pleasure and happiness, whereas economists
typically favor wealth, political theorists sometimes favor power, and
theologians sometimes favor piety.
The existence of different orders of preferences provides a
potential explanation for how a rational person would choose her own
preferences. If a person's lower-order preferences affect her
opportunities, then she should choose her lower-order preferences so
that the resulting opportunities maximize the satisfaction of her
higher-order preferences. To illustrate, a eudaemonist would choose
honesty over dishonesty provided that honesty increased her
happiness. Similarly, an ambitious politician might choose dishonesty
over honesty provided that dishonesty increased her power. If the
quote from Adam Smith that begins this Article is right, a person in
the "middling and inferior stations of life" who wants wealth will
cultivate virtue, specifically "prudent, just, firm, and temperate
conduct."
In general, higher-order preferences can provide a guide for
changing lower-order preferences. Moral philosophers devote much
time and energy to understanding rationality in higher-order
preferences, whereas ordinary people give relatively little thought to
this problem. Many people remain uncertain about their higher-
13 Kelvin J. Lancaster, A New Approach to Consumer Theory, 74J. POL. EcON. 132
(1966).
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order preferences. To illustrate, many people are unsure about the
extent to which the, prefer wealth over pleasure, happiness over fame,
or virtue over status.
Uncertainty makes higher-order preferences an imperfect guide
to choice. Fortunately, people often can make rational choices about
their lower-order preferences with little guidance from higher-order
preferences. This is possible when the effect of lower-order
preferences on opportunities is strong enough. To illustrate, if
learning diligence in school promotes both happiness and wealth,
then a student who remains unsure about the relative importance of
happiness and wealth still has sufficient reason to learn diligence. Or,
if Adam Smith is right, a middle class person who remains unsure
about the relative importance of virtue and fortune still has sufficient
reason to learn prudence and justice.
An idea borrowed from welfare economics may prove powerful in
generalizing this insight. Assume that a person with preferences U
enjoys opportunities F,. Let X, denote the point in F that maximizes
l,. Also assume that changing her performance in a way that im-
proves her character will improve her opportunities. Specifically, a
person with preferences U, who changes to U, causes opportunities to
change from F, to F,. Let X, denote the point in F that maximizes U,.
Should the person make the change? If the increase in
opportunities is large enough, then X, will be preferable to X, by
either set of preferences, U, or U,. In notation, U(X,) > U,(X) and
U(X,) > U,(X). After making the change in preferences, the
opportunities enjoyed by the person are better than before relative to
both her new preferences and her old preferences. This fact provides
a reason to make the change in preferences.
A change that is better with respect to the preferences of everyone
affected by it is called a Pareto improvement. By analogy, a change in
preferences that leaves the person better off with respect to both her
original preferences and her final preferences can be called a Pareto
scif-imlprovemlienlt.)
1) This concept is analyzed graphically in Robert Cooter, Models of Morality in Law
awl Ecnmic : Sr4f-Control and Self-Improvement for the "Bad lan" of Holmes, 78 B.U. L.
Rirv. 903, 923 fig.4 (1998). In proceeding from the simple to the complex,
microeconomics textbooks first explain the logic of preferences in a timeless world
and then introduce the complications of time later. Similarly, we discuss the logical
problcms of changing preferences in a timeless world. In this Article we have not
considered the problem of time-consistency, which requires reconciling rational
choice with shifting moods and temporary emotions.
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We have explained that the impetus to improve character often
comes from recognizing that better character will lead to more
opportunities. By offering more opportunities to people with better
agent character, firms motivate people to acquire better agent
character. Thus firms do not change people so much as firms give
people incentives to change themselves.
CONCLUSION
We have explained that agency problems beset firms and prompt
opportunistic behavior by employees. Opportunistic behavior
redistributes value, whereas cooperative behavior creates value and
thus contributes to profits. Agents who have internalized firm-specific
fairness norms are less inclined to opportunism and more able to
cooperate. Agents who internalize firm-specific fairness norms
acquire good agent character and act authentically from internalized
values, whereas agents with bad character act instrumentally and
opportunistically.
Good agent character conveys an advantage to superiors and
subordinates in forming cooperative relations with other people who
can read character. Evolution has, consequently, fitted us to signal
and detect character. For every host, however, evolution creates a
parasite. Effective dissemblers who transmit false signals also enjoy
the strategic advantage of deceiving others. Dissemblers, however, are
parasitic not only because they redistribute rather than create, but
also because they cannot successfully deceive anyone unless other
people behave authentically.
We conjecture that almost every firm benefits from effective
fairness norms within the firm, although the actual content of these
norms differs among firms. Thus, evolutionary forces operating both
among and within firms should reward, and therefore select for, good
firm character and good insight into character. Firms that survive,
however, may deal with outsiders in a variety of ways, some relying on
honesty and others on deception. In competitive equilibrium, all
firms that survive are equally profitable. The surviving mixture of
honesty and deception depends on the nature of the market. Some
markets, like insurance, presumably equilibrate at a mixture favoring
honest sellers, whereas other markets, like used cars, may equilibrate
at a mixture favoring dishonest sellers. Repeat transactions tend to
favor honesty, whereas large-valued one-shot transactions may tend to
favor dishonesty.
A similar argument applies to individuals. Individuals gain an
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advantage from insight into the character of others. Thus
evolutionary forces should reward and select for good insight into
character. Insofar as people have insight into character, people with
good agent character have the advantage of better opportunities to
get others to cooperate. Dissemblers, however, have the advantage of
eliciting trust that gives them the power to exploit others. Business
competition can exert strong pressures on character. Competition
tends to equilibrate rates of return. In evolutionary equilibrium,
authenticity and dissembling are equally profitable on average. 15 The
extent of authenticity and dissembling depends on the characteristics
of the market. Authentic signaling is easier to distinguish from
dissembling in repeat transactions than in one-shot transactions. In
repeat transactions, a person of good character will receive a wage
premium from employers who read character well. Consequently,
markets with repeat transactions tend to equilibrate when authentic
actors greatly outnumber dissemblers.
Distinguishing firms from markets preoccupies the theory of the
firm. Our reflections on good agent character suggest a difference
between firms and markets. Incomplete contracts aggravate agency
problems whose control depends especially on reputation and
character. People easily develop loyalty, including obligations of
fairness, towards organizations and co-agents. The firm overcomes
agency problems partly by developing loyalty among its agents. In
contrast, people seldom develop loyalty to markets. To illustrate, an
employee of General Motors is far more likely to feel loyalty towards
her company than towards the automobile industry. Firms exist partly
because good agent character solves the problem of cooperation
within firms better than good general character solves the problem of
cooperation in markets.
We assume that learning authenticity or dissembling requires a similar
investment of resources by the indiidual.
1733
* * * * * *
